Institutions told to trace who is really financing their work or risk falling foul of national security law
MI5 has warned that more than 100 UK-linked academics contributed to research projects allegedly funded to improve China's spying capabilities.
The Security Service issued an unusually public espionage alert this week naming the China General Technology Research Institute (CGTRI), also translated as the China Academy of General Technology (CAGT). MI5 says the organization has "very strong ties" to China's Ministry of State Security (MSS), the country's civilian intelligence agency.
According to MI5, CGTRI's "primary purpose" is to fund academic research that directly improves the MSS's technical espionage capabilities.
More than 100 UK-linked academics have contributed to CGTRI-funded projects involving AI, cybersecurity, covert communications, and steganography, the agency said. Some may not have known who was ultimately financing the work.
"This activity supports MSS espionage, which poses a threat to UK national security," MI5 said.
MI5 isn't accusing all of the academics involved of knowingly helping Chinese intelligence. Its alert acknowledges that many institutions and individuals likely dealt with CGTRI "in good faith" because of what it describes as the organization's "obfuscated links" to the MSS.
MI5 "strongly advised" UK universities to review immediately any current or planned collaboration with CGTRI and ensure that the MSS derives no further benefit from British research. Academics working with Chinese institutions are also being told to establish who is ultimately funding the research and make sure CGTRI isn't involved.
Researchers may also want to brush up on the National Security Act 2023. MI5 specifically highlighted two offenses: assisting a foreign intelligence service under section 3 and obtaining a material benefit from one under section 17.
Under section 3, a person can commit an offense if their conduct is likely to materially assist a foreign intelligence service with UK-related activities and they know, or "ought reasonably to know," that it is likely to do so. Section 17 separately covers accepting or retaining a material benefit when the recipient knows, or ought reasonably to know, that it came from a foreign intelligence service. Legitimate payment for lawful goods or services is excluded.
Having publicly identified CGTRI's alleged links to Chinese intelligence, MI5 warned that any institution or researcher continuing to conduct work funded by the organization should seek independent legal advice.
In other words, MI5 has put universities on notice: not knowing who was really behind the research money may have been understandable yesterday, but it is a considerably trickier argument today. ®